Edith Cowan University

Research Online
Research outputs 2014 to 2021
2021

Organizational factors associated with health worker protection
during the COVID-19 pandemic in four provinces of South Africa
Muzimkhulu Zungu
Kuku Voyi
Nosimilo Mlangeni
Saiendhra Vasudevan Moodley
Jonathan Ramodike

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworkspost2013
Part of the Epidemiology Commons
10.1186/s12913-021-07077-w
Zungu, M., Voyi, K., Mlangeni, N., Moodley, S. V., Ramodike, J., Claassen, N., ... Malotle, M. (2021). Organizational
factors associated with health worker protection during the COVID-19 pandemic in four provinces of South Africa.
BMC Health Services Research, 21, article 1080. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-021-07077-w
This Journal Article is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworkspost2013/11338

Authors
Muzimkhulu Zungu, Kuku Voyi, Nosimilo Mlangeni, Saiendhra Vasudevan Moodley, Jonathan Ramodike,
Nico Claassen, Elizabeth Wilcox, Nkululeko Thunzi, Annalee Yassi, Jerry Spiegel, and Molebogeng Malotle

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworkspost2013/11338

Zungu et al. BMC Health Services Research
(2021) 21:1080
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-021-07077-w

RESEARCH

Open Access

Organizational factors associated with
health worker protection during the COVID19 pandemic in four provinces of South
Africa
Muzimkhulu Zungu1,2*, Kuku Voyi2, Nosimilo Mlangeni1, Saiendhra Vasudevan Moodley2, Jonathan Ramodike1,2,
Nico Claassen2,3, Elizabeth Wilcox4, Nkululeko Thunzi1,5, Annalee Yassi4, Jerry Spiegel4 and Molebogeng Malotle1

Abstract
Background: Health workers, in short supply in many low-and-middle-income countries, are at increased risk of
SARS-CoV-2 infection. This study aimed to assess how South Africa, prepared to protect its health workers from
SARS-CoV-2 infection.
Methods: This was a cross-sectional study design applying participatory action research in four provinces of South
Africa. A semi-structured questionnaire and a qualitative observational HealthWISE walkthrough risk assessment was
carried out to collect data on occupational safety and health (OSH) systems in 45 hospitals across four provinces to
identify factors associated with health worker protection. Adapting the International Labour Organization (ILO) and
World Health Organization (WHO) HealthWISE tool, we compiled compliance scores through walkthrough surveys.
We used logistic regression to analyze the relationship between readiness indicators and the actual implementation
of protective measures.
Results: We found that health facilities in all four provinces had SARS-CoV-2 plans for the general population but
no comprehensive OHS plan for health workers. Provincial Departments of Health (PDoH) varied in how they were
organized to respond: Provinces A and D had an OSH SARS-CoV-2 provincial coordinating team and a dedicated
budget for occupational health; Province A had an occupational health doctor and nurse; while Province B had an
occupational health nurse; Province A and D PDoHs had functional OSH committees; and Province D had
conducted some health risk assessments specific to SARS-CoV-2. However, none of the assessed health facilities had
an acceptable HealthWISE compliance score (≥ 75%) due to poor ventilation and inadequate administrative control
measures. While the supply of personal protective equipment was adequate, it was often not worn properly. Our
study found that having an OSH SARS-CoV-2 policy was significantly associated with higher personal protective
equipment and ventilation scores. In addition, our analysis showed that hospitals with higher compliance
scores had significantly lower infection rates (IRR 0.98; 95% CI: 0.97, 0.98).
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Conclusions: Despite some initial preparedness, greater effort to protect health workers is still warranted. Low-andmiddle-income countries may need to pay more attention to OSH systems and consider using tools, such as ILO/
WHO HealthWISE tool, to protect health workers’ health.
Keywords: SARS-CoV-2, Occupational safety and health systems, HealthWISE

Background
The World Health Organization (WHO) declared severe
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)
a Public Health Emergency of International Concern and
subsequently a Global Pandemic on January 30 and March
11, 2020, respectively [1, 2]. As of April 30, 2021, globally,
there were 150,110,310 cases and 3,158,792 deaths from
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) [3]. South Africa, a
low-and-middle-income country (LMIC) in Sub-Saharan
Africa, had 1,581,210 cases and 54,350 deaths in the general population [4]. The National Institute for Occupational Health (NIOH) in South Africa reported that out of
231,552 COVID-19 hospital admissions recorded up to
April 10, 2021, 6877 (2.9%) were health workers [5].
Lan et al., [6] reported that health workers were at
high risk along with other occupational groups and
noted that their COVID-19 infection rate occurrence
time-lagged as a reflection of heightened infection prevention and control (IPC) measures in health settings
[6]. Health workers were also among the highest risk occupations for exposure to the previous severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic [7]. They were
further identified as a high-risk occupational group in
Asian countries during both the SARS and the Middle
East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coronavirus outbreaks [8]. Clinicians and those performing aerosolgenerating procedures in particular account for a significant proportion of SARS-CoV-2 infection and may experience exceptionally high infection incidence following
unprotected exposure [9].
There have been conflicting reports on the risk of
SARS-CoV-2 infection in health workers. Canova et al.,
[10] reported a low risk of infection of health workers
during routine short clinical examination and short
physical contact [10]. Folgueira et al., [11] reported ‘no
statistically significant difference in the proportion of
SARS-CoV-2 positive polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
detection between health workers from high-risk areas
involved in close contact with COVID-19 patients in
comparison with clerical, administrative, or laboratory
personnel without direct contact with patients’ [11].
However, early reports from China suggested that health
workers were at an increased risk of SARS-CoV-2 [12,
13]; and the SARS-CoV-2 risk was dependent on performing high-risk work associated with respiratory aerosol production, long work hours and suboptimal hand
hygiene [14].

An occupational safety and health (OSH) system is a
sub-system of a country’s overarching health systems;
South Africa has a unified health system under the National Department of Health with service delivery in public and private sectors [15]. Service delivery in the public
sector is the responsibility of nine provincial departments
of health (PDoHs). According to the WHO, a health system comprises six building blocks: leadership/governance
(health policy, accountability and transparency, and coordination); financing; health workforce; medical products
and technology; information, and service delivery [16, 17].
Since standardized health system components model is
not disease specific, jurisdictions such as South Africa can
readily utilize it in assessing the SARS-CoV-2 readiness of
OSH systems at a PDoH level [17]. In South Africa, health
and safety committees (HSC) are mandatory under the
Occupational Health and Safety Act. However, the effectiveness of these bodies is varied and a matter for continued strengthening [18].
Health workers, themselves an essential component in
the six health system building blocks described by WHO
[16], continue to be a scarce vital resource in the fight
against SARS-CoV-2, especially in LMICs. The WHO
estimates a projected shortfall of about 18 million health
workers by 2030; this shortfall is even more critical in
South East Asia and the African regions [19, 20]. There
are international calls for LMICs, especially in South
East Asia and the African region, to put in place OSH
systems and SARS-CoV-2 IPC measures to protect
health workers and guard against the collapse of health
services secondary to COVID-19. Additionally, protecting health workers is a matter of social justice for this
occupational group, irrespective of the legal obligation
to provide a safe work environment or the need for
health workers to provide care for others.
South Africa has been preparing for SARS-CoV-2
since early February 2020, mainly to protect its health
workers before the upsurge of cases in the southern
hemisphere. These interventions rely on a strong OSH
system and possible utilization of affordable and costeffective OSH tools, such as the joint International
Labour Organization (ILO) and WHO’s Work Improvement in Health Services (HealthWISE) [21]. Two of
HealthWISE’s four principles are building on local practices and resources and promoting learning-by-doing.
HealthWISE is a participatory tool for identifying potential hazards (such as SARS-CoV-2) and implement
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relevant control measures in LMICs. In the COVID-19
pandemic context, HealthWISE encourages managers
and staff to work together to improve SARS-CoV-2 IPC
and OSH interventions [21]. South Africa participated in
the pilot of the HealthWISE tool [22]. Its effectiveness in
improving OSH in health care facilities has been evaluated previously in South Africa [22], but not in the specific context of protecting health workers against SARSCoV-2.
We aimed to explore the extent to which South Africa
has been abiding by its legal and social responsibility to
protect health workers, a potentially vulnerable workforce by 1) assessing the readiness of OSH systems in
place to protect health workers from SARS-CoV-2 in
four PDoHs using the WHO’s health system framework;
2) conducting a health facility assessment for the protection of health workers against SARS-CoV-2 infection
based on principles of the HealthWISE tool; and 3) ascertaining the relationship between, on the one hand,
the existence of policies and/or easy-to-use tools such as
HealthWISE, and, on the other hand, the implementation of concrete OSH programmes and/or protective
measures at the time (April – June) that WHO declared
a global pandemic.

Methods
Study design

We used a cross-sectional study design applying participatory action research (PAR) principles to enable
action and empower active participation in strengthening OSH [23]. Our study design and methods were
selected to enable interaction between the researchers
and participants at all stages, including data collection. The PAR design was chosen for its blurring of
the distinction between ‘researcher’ and ‘researched’,
since all involved in this project participated in all
stages of generating knowledge and its implementation, allowing both learning and putting the knowledge generated about OHS COVID-19 interventions
into action to protect health workers [24, 25]. We
also provided advisory and collective steps for corrective measures where necessary to prevent or halt
the spread of SARS-CoV-2 among health workers
using an adopted HealthWISE tool. We ensured that
responsibility and decisions necessary for action were
shared and acted upon between the research team,
managers and health workers. We conducted the research in collaboration with the participants as active
partners to promote sustainability in line with both
HealthWISE and PAR principles [21, 23]. This research was part of a larger study, with four different
components, including a COVID-19 knowledge attitudes and practice survey, in which some of our
methods were described [26].
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Study setting and population

The study setting was public sector facilities in Gauteng,
Limpopo, Mpumalanga, and North-West Provinces of
South Africa. These facilities are government-run (by
provincial departments of health) and provide services to
mainly the uninsured population. The facilities included
in the study comprised hospitals at different levels of
care (district, regional, tertiary, central, and specialized
psychiatric) and community health centres across urban
and rural settings. We refer to participating provinces as
Province A - D (assigned randomly) in the remainder of
the paper to maintain confidentiality and a culture of ‘no
blame,’ following the principles of the HealthWISE tool.
The study population included PDoHs OSH managers
(completed the study questionnaires), and OSH professionals and health workers (conducted an inventory of
the OSH state using the HealthWISE tool but did not
provide any individual level information for the research). Health workers included managers, IPC professionals and other frontline staff from all participating
PDoHs.
Sampling

We premised our study sampling on the operational
needs of the participating PDoHs and South Africa’s
newly formed COVID-19 OSH work steam (committee)
under the National Department of Health. It was under
this committee that the four participating PDoHs were
allocated to the researchers in this study for OSH technical support. The researchers working with the PDoH
officials then conveniently selected a total of 45 health
facilities based on perceived operational risk of SARSCoV-2, to include both urban and rural health facilities.
Purposive sampling was utilized to select PDoHs respondents and health workers (to conduct the OSH inventory
based on HealthWISE tool) from the participating health
facilities in consultation with hospital management. Respondents were selected because of their likely knowledge of the systems in question and with the intent of
ensuring that a variety of views would be represented.
Respondents therefore included OSH and environmental
health professionals, unit managers, and trade union
representatives.
Measurement tools and data collection

We developed an interviewer-driven semi-structured
questionnaire based on the WHO building blocks of a
health system [16], the ILO Convention 161 [27] and a
multi-country OHS survey by Rantanen et al. [28], with
closed-ended questions. Two occupational hygienists
and two occupational medicine doctors tested the feasibility of the questionnaire. Lastly, we collected data from
four PDoHs OSH managers on the SARS-CoV-2 readiness of the provincial governments.
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We also used an adapted HealthWISE tool [21]—incorporating some elements of the CDC guidelines for TB
IPC [29]—to conduct a qualitative observational HealthWISE walkthrough risk assessment of the health facilities.
During the walkthrough assessment, the researchers and
facility health workers assessed distinct work areas: i) the
main passenger and vehicle entrance (staffed by security
personnel); ii) accident and emergency area (staffed by
frontline health workers including security, administrative
clerks, porters, cleaners, nurses and medical doctors); iii)
the outpatient department (with similar staff as the accident and emergency area); and iv) the SARS-CoV-2 dedicated wards for suspected and confirmed patients (staffed
by specialized nursing, medical and cleaning staff). The assessment focused primarily on the “hierarchy of controls”
areas of ventilation, administrative control, and personal
protective equipment [30] for SARS-CoV-2. The two data
collection tools were tested in an initial pilot with five hospitals from the participating PDoHs in April 2020, while
the full PAR was conducted between April 28 and June
15, 2020.
Variables measured

Variables of interest for the assessment of OSH readiness included the availability of a policy document to
protect health workers, such as an OSH policy or IPC
policy specific to the protection of health workers, the
PDoHs coordination structure, and the availability of occupational medical doctor (OMP) or occupational health
nurse (OHN). For the facility assessment, we calculated
a total HealthWISE compliance score for each assessed
area in the hospital, with a total possible score of 86 per
hospital. The total HealthWISE scores were compiled
from three categories: administrative control (possible
score of 56), ventilation scores (possible score of 14),
and PPE control (possible score of 16). We also collected
hospital-specific information on infection rates among
staff and the total number of employees.
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intervals. Finally, we used Poisson regression to study
the association between the number of cases at a hospital (dependent variable) and the compliance score (independent variable), offset by the total number of
employees at the hospital.
Intervention

This intervention was conducted in the context of
health system strengthening, specifically with the goal
of assisting the PDoHs and health facilities in protecting the health and safety of its limited health workers
amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Using PAR methods,
the researchers provided a four-hour training on the
data collection tools and the basics of the HealthWISE tool for each participating health facility and
provincial department of health. This was followed by
immediate data collection and administering of the
adapted HealthWISE tool. Whenever the researchers
identified gaps, the researchers and health facility
personnel took immediate corrective advice and action. This action was followed by technical report
briefings to provincial and hospital management on
OSH and SARS-CoV-2 interventions for their province and health facility.

Results
Provincial assessment of OSH for health workers’
readiness for SARS-CoV-2
Participant characteristics

Four PDoHs—representing 170,686 health workers—
participated in the OSH readiness assessment. The OSH
directorate represented provinces A and B. The Employee Health and Wellness directorate and the Department of Public Health Medicine represented Provinces
C and D, respectively. By June 12, 2020, the four PDoHs
had 3675 SARS-CoV-2 cumulative cases among health
workers (2670 in Province A, 599 in Province B, 207 in
Province C, and 199 in Province D).

Data management and analysis

We performed double data entry and analysis on Microsoft Excel. We then imported the files into STATA version 16 (Stata Corp (2017) Stata Statistical Software:
Release 15. College Station, TX: StataCorp LLC) for further analysis. The HealthWISE score out of 86 was calculated. The percentage compliance for each facility was
calculated. Each health facility compliance score was
graded according to Acceptable ≥75%; Requiring improvement (74–50%); and Unacceptable < 50%.
Logistic regression was used to model the association
between HealthWISE scores (dependent variable) and
the likelihood of a PDoH having a COVID-19 OHS policy or IPC policy (independent variable). We calculated
the odds ratio and the respective 95% confidence

Provincial occupational health services readiness for the
protection of health workers

At the time of data collection, all four provinces had recently developed provincial SARS-CoV-2 plan from
which they were working, albeit not specific for OSH for
health workers. In addition, provinces A and C had an
IPC policy specific for SARS-CoV-2 in the health sector.
Only Provinces A and D had OSH SARS-CoV-2 provincial coordinating teams and a dedicated budget for OSH.
At the PDoHs level, only Province A had an occupational medical practitioner. Provinces A and B had an
occupational health nurse. All PDoHs had an IPC manager and an environmental health practitioner, except
for Province C, which lacked the latter. Only Province A
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had an occupational hygienist, and only Province C
lacked employee health and wellness professionals.
Statutory laws in South Africa require employers to have
health and safety representatives and committees, but
only Province A and D had functional health and safety
committees.
At the time of data collection, all PDoHs had provided SARS-CoV-2 training to a proportion of their
health workforce. Province A provided the seasonal
influenza vaccine to its health workers. Province D
had conducted some health risk assessments specific
to SARS-CoV-2. Provinces A and D reported having
rehabilitation plans for infected and affected health
workers and regularly screen them looking for incident cases. All Provinces but Province B provided
treatment and mental health services. However, provinces B and C did not have adequate personal protective equipment.
All four PDoHs reported that they were collecting
SARS-CoV-2 data from their health facilities using a tool
(these differed in all the PDoHs). The PDoHs reasons
for collecting data included reporting to National Government Authorities, including the Department of
Health and Department of Employment and Labour, and
the Department of Public Service and Administration,
the employer of public servants in South Africa. Except
for Province D, all the PDoHs indicated that they had a
server to store the data, and none of the PDoH had a
monitoring and evaluation plan.

Health facility assessment based on principles of the
HealthWISE tool
Health facilities and participants in the qualitative
observational HealthWISE walkthrough risk assessment

Forty-five health facilities representing 34,192 health
workers (i.e. 20% of the health workforce in the four
PDoHs studied) participated and were trained in the
qualitative observational HealthWISE walkthrough risk
assessment for SARS-CoV-2 in the health facilities.
The health workers who were trained and participated
in the HealthWISE walkthrough risk assessment
included: occupational medical practitioners, occupational health nurses, environmental health practitioners, IPC nurses, quality assurance nurses, and
hospital managers (medical, nursing managers and finance). In addition, the sample included employee
health and wellness practitioners and trade unions.
Participation of occupational health doctors, occupational health nurses, EHPs, and IPC nurses depended
on whether the hospital had such professionals on
their staff establishment. As such, we used this indicator as a proxy for the availability of OSH services
in that particular health facility.
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HealthWISE walkthrough risk assessment findings for all
facilities

The main entrance to the health facilities is the first
contact between patients and the health facilities. It has
a pedestrian gate or door-like structure and boom gate
for vehicles which is manned by security guards. The
walkthrough (Table 1) observed that the opportunity for
close contact between security personnel and pedestrian
patients as well as security personnel and drivers of vehicles was highly probable. Both the pedestrians and
drivers had to sign in a security booklet; during this
period, the opportunity of cross-infection increased due
to the proximity of individuals, exchange of pens and
booklets, and poor attention to IPC protocols.
While ventilation in the main entrance was adequate
for health workers in the outdoors security area, security
guard houses were often small and crowded and lacked
windows or any other form of ventilation. During the
walkthrough, a lack of administrative control was immediately apparent, as there was a general lack of posters
and signs. There were crowded chairs indicative of no
social distancing, even in the absence of health workers
in the area. The majority of security guards were wearing
cloth masks but had them below their noses.
The accident and emergency areas in most health facilities were high-risk with a twenty-four-hour operation.
We display the findings of the HealthWISE walkthrough
risk assessment in Table 2. Ventilation was a considerable challenge in the majority of assessed health facilities. Natural ventilation was impaired by mostly poor
facility design, while mechanical ventilation was not
available in 82% of facilities and when available was
broken and had a poor maintenance record. In the
health facilities assessed early on in the study, we noticed that administrative controls would only be followed
and monitored during working hours. Afterhours, there
is no extra staff assisting with the enforcement of IPC
measures, leading to a lack of implementation and monitoring of IPC measures for evening and night shifts.
In the accident and emergency department, the social
distancing of staff was a great challenge due to insufficient space and high patient load. In some of the health
facilities assessed, we found that they had or planned to
have makeshift working areas using tents in some instances. This arrangement led to overcrowding, more
pronounced in urban facilities. Health facilities in rural
areas had high patient volumes in the mornings and almost no patients in the afternoons, allowing for social
distancing. Health workers across facilities were often
found congregating when engaging in administrative
work or not attending to patients. There were many facilities with small or no rest areas leading to health
workers crowding the administrative areas for their
paperwork and resting periods. It was, however,
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Table 1 Overall main entrance HealthWISE walkthrough risk assessment findings
Main pedestrian and vehicle entrance to the health facility
Prevention
Measures

Question

% of
facilities
deemed
adequate

Ventilation

Is outdoor ventilation adequate?

53

47

All outdoor entrances had good natural ventilation.

Is indoor ventilation adequate?

0

100

No mechanical ventilation, windows & doors not open.

Are patients social distancing?

54

46

Majority of staff not social distancing

Are staff social distancing?

33

67

In the bigger facilities there were more security guards at the
gate and there was lower likelihood of no social distancing.

Are there markings for social
distancing?

13

87

There were limited markings for social distancing

Is furniture positioned for social
distancing?

23

77

There was no rearrangement of furniture to allow for social
distancing even when space allows

Are there posters or information
leaflets about COVID-19?

24

76

There were few COVID-19 posters in most of the facilities
across the PDoH and when present did not address health
workers but patients..

Is there an area with water and
soap to clean hands?

22

78

Lack of water basin and soap in certain areas particularly
Province A was an issue but overall there was water and
soap.

Are there hand sanitizers in all
entrances and exit points?

86

14

There seems to be huge investment in hand sanitizers

Is waste properly segregated?

0

100

Majority of the facilities only had general waste bins and
were not prepared for medical waste (SARS-CoV-2).

Are COVID-19 waste management boxes

0

100

This was almost non-existent in the majority of facilities.

Are workers wearing appropriate
PPE?

18

82

At the entrance of the facility we expected surgical masks
but majority of personnel were wearing cloth masks. There
were also a few health workers who were wearing cloth
mask inside the hospital. Since PPE is critical for this
pandemic and investments have been huge, the facilities
should train workers and supply appropriate PPE

Are they wearing PPE correctly?

11

89

The surgical mask was sometimes below the nose and not
covering both mouth and nose

Are the staff wearing the same
clothes from home, during work
and back home?

0

100

Since may carry SARS-CoV-2 fomites on clothing, it is advisable that health workers change clothes to PPE on arrival
and change back to their clothing when departing work.

Do you think there is adequate
PPE?

82

18

Generally, there was some form of PPE available

Administrative
measures

Personal
Protective
Equipment

% of facilities
requiring
improvement

concerning that there were only 25% of health facilities
with SARS-CoV-2 posters or educational materials.
Waste management was generally good in the majority
of assessed health facilities. Eighty-nine (89) percent of
the health workers were wearing the appropriate PPE,
but only 36% of health facilities were wearing it correctly. In all the health facilities, health workers in the
accident and emergency department would come to
work in their uniform, work with it and return home
wearing it, though in most cases the health workers
would wear a disposable over gown with their clothing.
The findings for the outpatient departments in the
assessed health facilities (Table 3) were similar to the accident and emergency department walkthrough. About
20% of health facilities assessed had natural ventilation

Comments

and only 4% had mechanical ventilation, with Province
A facilities being most affected by poor ventilation. Social distancing was adhered to and deemed adequate in
67% of health facilities by their patients. Most health facilities aided this by marking brightly and visibly cancelling out some chairs or seating areas and rendering
them unavailable for use. Patients standing in queues
were assisted with markings of distances of between
≥1.5 m to maintain social distance. Health workers had
no or low access to often small dining and rest areas,
leading to poor social distancing. Several health facilities
had rearranged the furniture to allow for social distancing, albeit not adequately due to poor infrastructure
and lack of space. A notable issue was the lack of posters
and information on how health workers can protect
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Table 2 Overall Accident and Emergency area HealthWISE walkthrough risk assessment findings
Accident and Emergency Department
Prevention
Measures

Question

Ventilation

Is natural ventilation adequate?

25

75

Poor culture of opening windows,

Is mechanical ventilation
adequate

18

82

lack of mechanical ventilation

Are patients social distancing?

58

42

Most of the facilities have provisions for patients social
distancing such as markings and queue marshals.

Is staff social distancing?

29

71

Majority of the staff were not practicing social distancing
particularly when they were in their workstations, there is a
space shortage

Are there markings for social
distancing?

51

49

Inside the area there was a considerable number of
institutions without markings for social distancing in their
accident and emergency area.

Is furniture positioned for social
distancing?

25

75

There was no rearrangement of furniture to allow for social
distancing mostly due to lack of space.

Are the posters or information
leaflets about COVID-19?

25

75

Majority of the facilities have few and poor quality Covid-19
posters and very few facilities have posters that addresses
OSH of HWs against Covid-19

Is there an area with water and
soap to clean hands?

97

3

With regards to the few facilities that did not have water, it
was a municipality issue of a water outage in the whole
municipality during the walk through

Are there hand sanitizers in all
entrances and exit points?

58

42

Some accident and emergency departments did not have
visible hand sanitizers in their entrances or exits. One of the
challenges mentioned was to put them in the strategic
positions e.g. entrances and exit points

Administrative
measures

Personal
Protective
Equipment

% of
facilities
deemed
adequate

% of facilities
requiring
improvement

Comments

Is waste properly segregated?

92

8

Are COVID-19 waste management boxes?

72

28

Are workers wearing appropriate
PPE?

89

11

There were those few health workers that were not wearing
appropriate PPEs e.g. cloth masks in accident and
emergency

Are workers wearing PPE
correctly?

36

64

The surgical mask were sometimes below the nose

Are the staff wearing the same
clothes from home, during work
and back home?

0

100

Since may carry SARS-CoV-2 fomites on clothing, it is advisable that health workers change clothes to PPE on arrival
and change back to their clothing when departing work.

Do you think there was
adequate PPE?

94

6

Generally, there was some form of PPE available

themselves from being infected with SARS-CoV-2.
There was access to water, soap and sanitizers for hand
hygiene and proper management of waste from SARSCoV-2 contaminated materials. On observation, workers
were wearing PPE though it varied with a few wearing
cloth masks and surgical masks and many using respirators, particularly N95 respirators.
The wards dedicated to suspected and confirmed
SARS-CoV-2 patients varied considerably within and between provinces (Table 4). Some facilities did not have
these wards or were still in the preparatory stages for
these wards (i.e. renovations were taking place). Ventilation in these wards was mechanized and working in the
facilities with dedicated wards for SARS-CoV-2 patients.

However, in Province A, there were a few health facilities with poor ventilation with non-functioning mechanical ventilation. In almost all health facilities assessed,
the suspected and confirmed SARS-CoV-2 patients were
socially distancing or kept in physically separated rooms.
Health workers were social distancing in the main, except in a few health facilities in Province A, where we
found health workers seated close to the main administration desk area when not attending to patients. Most
of the health facilities had set up the furniture to allow
for social distancing.
The posters in these wards were not specific for OSH
or the protection of health workers, and their placement
in the wards was not ideal for easy access by health
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Table 3 Overall Outpatient Department HealthWISE walkthrough risk assessment findings
Outpatient Department
Prevention
Measures

Question

% of
facilities
deemed
adequate

% of facilities
requiring
improvement

Comments

Ventilation

Is natural ventilation adequate?

20

80

The majority of the Province A facilities required a lot of
improvement, there was poor natural ventilation

Is there adequate mechanical
ventilation

4

96

There was no mechanical ventilation, on in few facilities

Are patients social distancing?

67

33

Very few facilities were not ensuring that patients are
observing social distancing. A few health facilities were using
queue marshals to control social distancing.

Are staff social distancing?

25

75

Health workers concentrated around administrative desks to
write notes, use telephone, complete forms, and even
socialize. Small or lack of dining and rest areas contributed.

Are there markings for social
distancing?

49

51

These were lacking in most OPDs

Is furniture positioned for social
distancing?

40

60

Some hospitals had not rearranged the furniture for social
distancing as the distance between the furniture was the
same as before the Covid-19 pandemic, but some did not
have space to change arrangement

Are the posters or information
leaflets about COVID-19?

16

84

A few of the facilities had COVID-19 posters but they did not
indicate how health workers can protect themselves and
they were of poor quality

Is there an area with water and
soap to clean hands?

96

4

With regards to the few facilities that did not have water, it
was a municipality issue of a water outage in the whole
municipality during the walk through

Are there hand sanitizers in all
entrances and exit points?

58

42

Is waste properly segregated?

93

7

Are COVID-19 waste management boxes present

74

26

Are workers wearing appropriate
PPE?

93

7

Are they wearing PPE correctly?

29

71

The surgical mask was sometimes below the nose

Are the staff wearing the same
clothes from home, during work
and back home?

0

100

Since may carry SARS-CoV-2 fomites on clothing, it is advisable that health workers change clothes to PPE on arrival
and change back to their clothing when departing work.

3

Generally there was some form of PPE available

Administrative
measures

Personal
Protective
Equipment

Do you think there was adequate 97
PPE

workers. The facilities had water, soap and sanitizers except for one health facility with no water due to municipality failures for the whole town. Sanitizers, while
present, were not strategically placed for easy access by
health workers. Waste management was adequate, and
health workers were able to discard with ease all contaminated materials. Health workers had access and
were wearing PPE correctly with the exception of a few
health facilities in Province A. Some health facilities in
Province C displayed some elements of best practice as
they had a suspect and confirmed SARS-CoV-2 patient
ward separate from the rest of the hospital building, and
the health workers for that ward were isolated from the
rest of the hospital, stayed in accommodation provided

by the hospital, and utilized hospital clothing and PPE
during their shifts.
Table 5 presents the individual HealthWISE scores per
health facility. The lowest was 14/86, while the highest
was 64/86 (median 40, IQR 25–52), administrative
scores were from 6/56–46/56 (median 28, IQR 17–36),
ventilation scores were from 0/14–11/14 (median 4, IQR
2–6), and PPE scores were from 3/16–15/16 (median 9,
IQR 7–11). None of the health facilities met the criteria
for acceptable HealthWISE score of ≥ 75%, and 42% had
an unacceptable HealthWISE score of below 50%.
The results of the logistic regression analysis assessing
the availability of a provincial policy and hospital preparedness indicators showed that PPE and ventilation

Zungu et al. BMC Health Services Research

(2021) 21:1080

Page 9 of 15

Table 4 Overall SARS-CoV-2 dedicated wards for suspected and confirmed patients HealthWISE walkthrough risk assessment
findings
SARS-CoV-2 dedicated wards for suspected and confirmed patients
Prevention
Measures

Question

Ventilation

Is natural ventilation adequate? 57

43

Is there adequate mechanical
ventilation

21

79

Are patients social distancing?

83

17

All of the patients under investigation were practicing social
distancing

Is staff social distancing?

83

17

Particularly during rest periods and when doing administrative
work

Is furniture positioned for social 81
distancing?

19

Are there posters or
information leaflets about
COVID-19?

89

Few of the facilities had COVID-19 posters but they did not indicate how health workers can protect themselves and they
were of poor quality.

Is there an area with water and 97
soap to clean hands?

3

During the walkthrough, one facility in Province B did not
have water as there was water outage in the whole town.

Are there hand sanitizers at all
entrances and exit points?

95

5

Is waste properly segregated?

94

6

Are COVID-19 waste management boxes present

79

21

Are workers wearing
appropriate PPE?

85

15

Administrative
measures

Personal
Protective
Equipment

% of facilities % of facilities
deemed
requiring
adequate
improvement

11

Are they wearing PPE correctly? 86

14

Is the staff wearing same
clothes from home, during
work and back home?

95

5

Do you think there is adequate 70
PPE

Comments

Some of the Province A facilities need significant
improvements

Since may carry SARS-CoV-2 fomites on clothing, it is advisable that health workers change clothes to PPE on arrival and
change back to their clothing when departing work.

30

scores were statistically associated with the availability of
a COVID-19 provincial policy (Table 6). The presence
or implementation of the provincial policy was associated with an increase in PPE score.
Hospital staff infection rate and compliance score

From March 5, 2020 to June 15, 2020, the cumulative
hospital infection rate for COVID-19 at the 45 facilities
ranged from 0 to 17.9%, with a median 0.3% infection
rate (IQR: 0.0–0.9%). We applied nonparametric statistical tests because the data seemed non-normal (Shapiro-Wilk test: p < 0.001). We further adjusted by the
total number of employees given that plotting infection
rate against compliance score showed there might be
some clustering by province (Fig. 1).
We classified each hospital into two categories: lower
compliance or higher compliance, using the median
score (40) to determine categories (Fig. 2). The lower
compliance group (with a score < 40) had a median infection rate of 0.75%, and the higher compliance group

(with score ≥ 40) had a median infection rate of 0.15%.
While the infection rate is low for both groups, the
Mann-Whitney U test showed a significant difference
between the medians of the two groups (p = 0.03). Our
adjusted Poisson Regression estimated an incidence rate
ratio of 0.89 (95% Confidence Interval: 0.86, 0.91) for
each 5% increment in the compliance score.

Discussion
When we conducted our study, the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic was still moving towards its peak with at least
106,108 cases and the epidemic curve still rising sharply
in South Africa [31, 32]. The national data indicated
SARS-CoV-2 cases clustering among health workers in
some health facilities, a phenomenon that was expected
with plans to contain it.
Our PAR conducted early in the pandemic aimed to
assess the OSH system for health worker’s readiness for
SARS-CoV-2; and to assess health facilities for the protection of health workers against SARS-CoV-2 infection
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Table 5 HealthWISE compliance scores
Province

Hospital Ventilation score
(14)

Administrative score
(56)

PPE score
(16)

Total Score
(86)

Mean
Score

Acceptable compliance
(≥ 75%)

Province
A

PA 1

11

24

10

45

15

No = 52,3%

PA 2

0

16

6

22

7

No = 25,6%

PA 3

4

41

11

56

19

No = 65,1%

PA 4

0

25

9

34

11

No = 39,5%

PA 5

0

35

10

45

15

No = 52,3%

PA 6

0

16

6

22

7

No = 25,6%

PA 7

2

8

10

20

7

No = 23,3%

PA 8

0

11

9

20

7

No = 23,3%

PA 9

2

6

10

18

6

No = 20,9%

Province B PB 1

4

37

8

49

16

No = 57,0%

PB 2

9

34

8

51

17

No = 59,0%

PB 3

5

37

11

53

18

No = 62,0%

PB 4

3

28

7

38

13

No = 59,0%

PB 5

4

26

8

38

13

No = 59,0%

PB 6

11

43

10

64

21

No = 74,0%

PB 7

10

36

10

56

19

No = 66,0%

PB 8

8

37

10

55

18

No = 64,0%

PB 9

7

36

9

52

17

No = 60,0%

PB 10

6

35

9

50

17

No = 58,0%

PB 11

5

10

7

22

7

No = 34,0%

PC 1

7

40

15

62

20

No = 72,0%

PC 2

6

42

15

63

21

No = 73,0%

PC 3

6

33

15

54

18

No = 63,0%

PC 4

6

30

15

51

17

No = 59,0%

PC 5

6

46

11

63

21

No = 73,0%

PC 6

5

23

11

39

13

No = 45,0%

PC 7

5

36

15

56

19

No = 65,0%

PC 8

3

32

11

46

15

No = 53,0%

PC 9

5

42

11

58

19

No = 67,0%

PC 10

8

42

12

62

20

No = 72,0%

PD 1

5

17

7

29

10

No = 34,0%

PD 2

4

24

6

34

11

No = 53,0%

PD 3

7

20

9

36

12

No = 42,0%

PD 4

2

12

4

18

6

No = 43,0%

PD 5

4

21

7

32

11

No = 50,0%

PD 6

6

31

5

42

14

No = 49,0%

PD 7

3

12

7

22

7

No = 34,0%

PD 8

6

28

10

44

15

No = 51,0%

PD 9

4

23

9

36

12

No = 42,0%

PD 10

2

16

3

21

7

No = 50,0%

PD 11

2

10

4

16

5

No = 38,0%

PD 12

2

19

4

25

8

No = 60,0%

PD 13

3

28

10

41

14

No = 47,0%

Province
C

Province
D
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Table 5 HealthWISE compliance scores (Continued)
Province

Hospital Ventilation score
(14)

Administrative score
(56)

PPE score
(16)

Total Score
(86)

Mean
Score

Acceptable compliance
(≥ 75%)

PD 14

4

31

10

45

15

No = 52,0%

PD 15

1

9

4

14

5

No = 33,0%

with reference to the principles of the HealthWISE tool.
The PAR methodology allowed for all participating
health worker irrespective of level of education or job
category to actively participate and be a ‘change agents’.
This, while getting empowered to manage SARS-CoV-2
in their own workplace. Participating health workers,
utilizing PAR and HealthWISE tool principles were able
to willingly identify SARS-CoV-2 IPC and OSH challenges; contextually appropriate, local and acceptable solutions as well as on an ongoing basis with the
researcher playing a facilitator and creating opportunities for change [33].
Provincial departments of health OSH readiness

There was a clear discrepancy in the availability of resources for OSH systems and their readiness for SARSCov-2 in the four PDoH. The Province A, which is in
the economic hub of South Africa, was more prepared
and had more resources compared to the other three
PDoHs, which are mostly rural. While only Province A
and D already had a policy on SARS-CoV-2 in healthcare, all the PDoH reported having health plans for protecting health workers from SARS-CoV-2. This finding
is consistent with studies examining TB IPC for health
workers where it was found that South Africa had IPC
policies but lacks in implementation [34, 35]. It was not
surprising that Province A, had an allocated budget for
the protection of health workers from SARS-CoV-2, as it
generally has more resources than other PDoH in South
Africa [36].
However, it was unexpected for Province D, since it is
generally a poorly resourced PDoH with limited human
resources for OSH, particularly occupational medical
and nursing professionals. While of serious concern, it
was not surprising that only Province A had an occupational medical practitioner driving the programme at the
provincial level. Province B had occupational health
nursing support at a provincial level, which is common
in South Africa, hence it was troubling that the Province
Table 6 Logistic Regression model assessing the association
between the Provincial Policy and indicators for hospital
preparedness
Variables

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

P Value

PPE Score

2.58 (1.66–4.91)

< 0.001

Ventilation Score

0.57 (0.34–0.82)

0.011

C had no medical or nursing support. This lack of occupational health trained personnel at provincial level to
assist in planning and managing the OSH system for
health workers in the fight against SARS-CoV-2 suggested to the authors that major gaps may exist in the
protection of health workers. While IPC nurses were
present in the health system, they did not play an active
role at a provincial or facility level in protecting the
health of health workers, their role was around general
IPC for the patients in main. It was however, a more
pressing emergency in Province C that they did not have
any of the essential human resources for the fight
against SARS-CoV-2 and or even OSH in general. This
shortage of OSH professionals not only in Province C
but also in Province B and D may constitute an obstacle
to the provision of OSH services [28].
Since our PAR was conducted in the early stages of
the epidemic, we hoped to check if the PDoHs were
prioritizing primary prevention and we were disappointed to learn that only one PDoH had carried out
the health risk assessments and two had procured
PPE. While the South African National Department
of Health had issued a directive for health workers to
receive the influenza vaccine, only Province D had
started offering its health workers influenza vaccinations. All the PDoH reported providing education and
training, albeit on general SARS-CoV-2 information.
There was some information related to the public
health and IPC response that was similar for OSH. It
was impressive that three of the PDoH were providing screening and testing, treatment and mental
health services for their health workers.
Overall, Province A, B and D had some elements of an
OSH system that were activated to protect the health
workers. While our PAR was targeted at assessing the
OSH system readiness for SARS-CoV-2 in PDoHs, it has
been able to identify the coverage of OSH for health
workers in line with calls from numerous sources including the United Nations Resolution on Sustainable
Development Goals [37, 38]. As shown by Rantanen
et al. [28], our study identified that all the assessed
PDoHs had some OSH systems coverage albeit of varying coverage and resources between the PDoHs, with
Province A being the most resourced and Province C
the least resourced. Our study further confirms the importance of having a health policy in place for health interventions, as shown by the fact that the odds of having
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Fig. 1 Infection rate by the compliance score of each hospital, indicated by province

an acceptable PPE score were 72% if the PDoH had a
SARS-CoV-2 policy for health workers.
HealthWISE walkthrough risk assessment

Our research team has previously trained health workers
in South Africa, particularly in Province A and B on the
use of HealthWISE [21, 22]; Using an adapted HealthWISE tool health workers and health facility managers
identified SARS-CoV-2 IPC measures. Based on the observation of our research team using the HealthWISE
tool, our research showed that in South Africa, OSH for
health workers was occupational health nurse driven and
with a large number of environmental health practitioners supporting at health facilities, with a significantly
low number of occupational medical practitioners. It
was concerning for the research team to find that only
about half of assessed health facilities had IPC nurses.
We were encouraged by the participation of very senior
health facility management including chief executives,
medical managers and nursing matrons highlighting
how seriously some health facilities were taking the
SARS-CoV-2 epidemic; as well as their understanding
and embracing of the HealthWISE way of doing OSH.
Our HealthWISE adapted tool concentrated in some
key areas of the health facilities to provide a snapshot of
what health workers and managers needed to prioritize

using limited resources. The research identified the
health facility entrance as the main area of strategic importance for not only alerting and increasing health
workers’ OSH practice, but also for influencing their
change of behavior under the new normal of SARSCoV-2. Overall, the HealthWISE tool indicated that
health facilities had not identified and actively prepared
their health facilities to protect health workers, patients
and visitors from SARS-CoV-2. The fact that none of
the assessed health facilities attained the acceptable
HealthWISE score of ≥75% was concerning, highlighting
the need for increased effort to protect the health of
health workers. This poor performance also highlighted
the importance of a pragmatic tool, such as HealthWISE,
which can be utilized by all health workers in order to
monitor and evaluate the performance of their OSH in
their workplace without the need for highly specialized
professionals. During the HealthWISE risk assessments,
we encountered a wide range of IPC and OSH practices
from non-existent to excessive measures between and
within the PDoHs, even though South Africa has produced national IPC guidelines for health settings [39].
Finally, our analysis of the relationship between OSH
compliance and infection rates in health workers importantly showed that those facilities with a score above
the median had a reduced risk compared to those below
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Fig. 2 Box plot comparing lower and higher compliance hospital infection rates. Each point represents a hospital. The boxes show the IQR (25th
to 75th percentile) with the bold horizontal line through the centre of the box showing the median

the median, which suggests that facilities should aim to
improve their score even when small improvements do
not lead to an acceptable level of compliance.
Overall, we found that a health policy is essential
for the implementation of an OSH programme for
health workers and that the HealthWISE approach to
assessing health facilities’ IPC and OSH readiness for
SARS-CoV-2, was very useful for health workers and
management without formal training in both IPC and
OSH. It also allowed for a more open, nonthreatening and acceptable way of bringing about
change as the managers and health workers were able
to identify gaps and recommend feasible interventions
often at no cost or within reasonable cost to both the
PDoH and health facility.
Limitations

As our study was conducted as part of a rapid appraisal
of COVID-19 OSH preparedness early in the pandemic
in South Africa, the need to provide OSH services at the
earliest possible time to protect the limited health workforce necessitated the use of operational research
methods. Hence the use of PAR, which may affect the
validity of the research since the researchers are also
part of the implementation, though this approach did
allow for strengthened implementation. We used

purposive sampling to select the four PDoHs OSH managers from whom we sought responses on the SARSCoV-2 readiness of the provincial governments; however, the possibility of “socially desirable answers” cannot be excluded. Our data collection instruments for
both SARS-CoV-2 readiness and HealthWISE were specifically designed for this study and the nature of the research under the COVID-19 pandemic being a rapid
appraisal under limited time may affect the validity of
our research. Our research gives a good indication of the
state of OSH, particularly COVID-19 readiness of the
health facilities included in our study but the nonprobability sampling strategy and potential biases in
qualitative assessments may limit the generalization of
the findings.
While, this paper reports on assessing the readiness
of OSH systems in place to protect health workers
from SARS-CoV-2 and conducting a health facility assessment for the protection of health workers against
SARS-CoV-2 infection based on principles of the
HealthWISE tool. It is part of a larger study which
also interviewed 45 respondents [40] based at hospital
level and also interviewed 286 frontline health
workers [26], who helped triangulate and interpret
the overall results, and assisted with validation of the
truthfulness of the responses provided by the OSH
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managers. Importantly, as noted above, respondents
included trade unionists and personnel at other levels
within the healthcare system who did not have any
incentive to provide an unwarranted favourable
perspective.

Conclusions
While South Africa is an upper-middle-income country,
there are vast differences in the resources for health between and within PDoH. Our study was able to show
these differences, with one province proving to have
abundant OSH resources, two provinces having some resources, while one province was severely underresourced in terms of IPC and OSH. Our timely assessment of the OSH system for SARS-CoV-2 also
highlighted the variability in coverage and services between and within PDoH, and allowed for timely alerts to
the relevant authorities so that appropriate interventional steps could be undertaken. At a health facility
level, the role of managers and health workers collaborating in improving the IPC and OSH measures using the
HealthWISE approach proved to be an acceptable and
appreciated method. It would be valuable to assess how
regular application of such self-assessment methods can
and do stimulate improvement in the processes of providing protection and in producing improved results as
the COVID-19 and other health risks endure.
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